×

Loading...
Ad by
  • 最优利率和cashback可以申请特批,好信用好收入offer更好。请点链接扫码加微信咨询,Scotiabank -- Nick Zhang 6478812600。
Ad by
  • 最优利率和cashback可以申请特批,好信用好收入offer更好。请点链接扫码加微信咨询,Scotiabank -- Nick Zhang 6478812600。

谢谢网友指正,这位哈佛教授天天出文章,很能赚稿费,关于参考德国重建推行民主的话是他另一篇相隔24小时的文章的内容,72小时在不同媒体登了三片相似长文。

Most public discussion this winter reflects a conviction that Ukraine must — and can — win a decisive victory. But what constitutes a win against a country such as Russia? As we consider the road ahead, we cannot escape the brute fact that Putin commands an arsenal of roughly 6,000 nuclear weapons that could kill us all.
Report

Replies, comments and Discussions:

  • 枫下茶话 / 和平之路 / ZT 哈佛教授警告:再打一年,乌克兰会更惨 +2
    https://info.51.ca/articles/1188018?wyacs=www-homepage

    俄国入侵乌克兰在2月24日届满周年,包括巴黎等许多欧洲城市都有纪念活动。(法新社)

    俄国入侵乌克兰在2月24日届满周年,美、欧主流媒体不断传出乌克兰的捷报,哈佛大学甘迺迪学院教授艾利森(Graham Allison)在期刊《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)撰文指出,跟去年同一时期相比,俄国多占领了乌克兰11%的领土,乌克兰的经济和能源基础设施更严重受创,远不及一年前。

    艾利森警告,假如俄乌战争还要再打个一年,且战况进度跟过去一年大同小异,那么在2024年2月24日战事届满2周年时,俄国将占领乌克兰近三分之一的领土,更别说军民的伤亡,尽管在官兵伤亡方面,俄乌情况一样惨。

    • 学界政界都是聪明人,都很明白,只是政界更厚黑,更权衡 +8
      • 商界不聪明吗?
        • 猪八界最聪明,出事就溜 +1
        • 商界要差点,本质上学界是政界的顾问,商界是政界的奴才和劳工
    • 美国欧洲还有武器没有给,俄罗斯等着吃苦头吧,俄军不退出占领地方这事不罢休
      • 乌克兰人的家园,乌克兰的决定,大陆大妈还挺操心的。🤣 +2
    • 俄罗斯停战,就没有战争了。乌克兰停战,就没有乌克兰了。 +9
      • 停不停,美国说了算。 +3
        • 是吗,当初美国反对开战的呀,俄罗斯可没听。
      • 所有的战争都是出现重创才能停止,俄罗斯如果国内出现重大政变才会停手,否则不可能半途而废,乌克兰只有在被打的政府都没有了才会停战,目前看条件都不满足,所以还停不了 +1
        • 俩口子打架呢?
          • 两口子受影响的因素多,孩子,财产,面子,打到了不可调和就得离婚
    • 当然啦,历史的教训早就告诉咱华人这些了,当年日本人打进中国就不该抵抗嘛,南京不抵抗,就没有大屠杀了嘛,为何要惹毛太君涅? +12
      • 日本打进东北就基本没啥抵抗, 日本得寸进尺中国才反击. 呵呵 +1
      • 所以说, 兆铭先生才是英雄
    • 哈佛教授?😄😄,吓唬不了我。 +7
    • 没有美国原子弹,我们照样抗日战争
      • 没有美国原子弹,日本人现在说汉语 +7
        • 这个思路好,啥时候让俄罗斯也说汉语 +2
          • 5,60年代大陆很多人说俄语,学校也主要教俄语,现在俄罗斯也是,看看那么多花姑娘都在学汉语
        • 正解,满清,蒙古人都作为异族统制过中国,最后都会融入中国的体制中,中华文化太强大,日本人来了早晚也会融入中国版图 +3
    • 正常啊。打仗的地方损失总是最大的。
    • 你最好能转载原文,这篇通过几次翻译和“加工”,最后再被51转载,很难知道这个教授的本意。 +2
      • 应该是这篇文章。是断章取意了。Lessons from a year of war in Ukraine +1
        • 谢谢!匆匆读了一下,教授在最后部分阐述了战争对乌俄双方带来的灾难和打击,但我没看出51网站所表达的这个主题。毫不奇怪,51网站一直有非常强烈的政治偏向。 +2
          • 教授made a good point. 那就是俄乌双方都应该考虑自己的cost and benefit of the war。个人感觉,如果继续的话,对俄乌双方都会cost超过benefit. 所以双方也许应该考虑和平停火。
            • 停火的主动权完全在俄罗斯一方,乌克兰在失去大量国土的情况下放下武器无异投降,也对不起牺牲的战士,天理不容。俄今年再次扩大战争规模,以全国之力孤注一掷,不仅极其危险,而且注定失败!对普京,回头是岸。 +1
            • 这位教授连续21,22,23发了三片内容相似,而稍有不同的文章,真能赚稿费,原理和ChatGPT差不多。文科生的确很高产。
              • 学界做讨论很正常,还得是政界说了算。
                • 这种内容差不多,有个小变化的文章ChatGPT最拿手,可惜质量不高,我们还是别太认真了。
          • A Report Card on the War in Ukraine +1
            If year two of the war were a carbon copy of the first, Russia would control almost one-third of Ukraine next February.
            • 还是这个教授,拭目以待,看明年2月,不过教授也说了,普京入侵乌克兰是一个grave strategic error。
            • 我认为是这篇,你之前给的链接不对(人之常情。这位教授也是年纪大了精力不够,出文章频率又很高,跟写日记差不多。)对俄罗斯的经济预测随便抄了些数据没有做分析就用到文章里,得出俄罗斯去年石油出口赚多了钱,今年经济增📈的笑话。
              • 算了,散了吧。很怕给这位教授带来不必要的压力呢。
                • 多虑了,人家看不到我们的留言,转发的网友会有些压力,不过眼看跟帖的那么多你该觉得有成就感的。
                  • 嗯。愿意和网友们交流观点和看法
    • 德国5万多人示威游行,左和右翼都参与了。64万人签名反对援助武器。没了外部支持,未来乌克兰很惨 +3
      • 这个你不用担心,德国8千多万热,64万占比例很小。 +3
        • 我不担心。。只是阐述事实。你也可以组织个10个人的示威,看看能不能组织起来。 +1
          • 德国已经用实际行动支持乌克兰,干嘛还要示威,有时间精力干点实在多好, +2
            • 你少写了“政府”二字,据说德国也是民主国家,据说示威展示民众与政府的不同意见乃是民主国家的标志之一,你是想说民众别不务正业,好好听政府指令、静静看政府干就行了?
            • 德国政府可以通过短期增加财务补贴安抚老百姓,但档不住制造业整体出走。实际行动就是提供武器但数量和时间都控制着。。。政府不可能不考虑左右翼的选民的。
            • 事实就是德国不断出钱出武器支持乌克兰对抗俄国,如果否认这个事实就在歪曲事实,你重复1万遍说自己是阐述事实也无济于事。 +1
    • 这位教授的原文:乌克兰不会也不应该在主权问题上让步,但是乌克兰应该参考德国考虑战后重建,推行民主。 +4
      • 原文居然是中文,赞这位教授学识渊博。
        • 你看不懂英文只看到英文引起的. +1
          • 说实话,我看不懂你这句中文。
            • 我也不是写给你看的,你去参加简单点儿的讨论吧。 +3
              • 原来你回我的帖不是写给我看的,你的中文及思路果然只适合某些特定医院内的“高等思想家”讨论。
                • 你连啥事回帖这么简单的问题没明白,以下内容不是给你的回帖“这位教授的原文:乌克兰不会也不应该在主权问题上让步,但是乌克兰应该参考德国考虑战后重建,推行民主” +2
                  • 上面在讨论51在翻译时可能掺杂了其政治倾向性,然后你贴个你自己的翻译说这是教授原文,呵呵,再来句不知所谓的“你看不懂英文只看到英文引起的”(这句我至今未懂),再来句“我也不是写给你看的”,你对上下文的诠释确实超出常人的理解范畴。
                  • 而你所谓的教授原文,相信是这两句的翻译:“Ukrainians will not give up their claim to liberate every inch of Ukrainian territory—nor should they. ”,“we remain realistically hopeful that at the end of the war, Ukraine will emerge as

                    a free, independent, vibrant nation” ,先不说领土(territory)和主权(你所谓的“原文”)的区别,哪里提到了“参考德国”?

                    另外,有种东西叫链接。

                  • 最后让我大胆踹测一下您原本想写的中文回帖,估计是:“你看不懂英文只看到--中--文引起的”。呵呵,先不说这非常一般的翻译质量,就这高人一等的优越感,啧啧,可惜连反讽都没看出来,哈哈。
                  • 谢谢网友指正,这位哈佛教授天天出文章,很能赚稿费,关于参考德国重建推行民主的话是他另一篇相隔24小时的文章的内容,72小时在不同媒体登了三片相似长文。
                    Most public discussion this winter reflects a conviction that Ukraine must — and can — win a decisive victory. But what constitutes a win against a country such as Russia? As we consider the road ahead, we cannot escape the brute fact that Putin commands an arsenal of roughly 6,000 nuclear weapons that could kill us all.
                    • 赞严谨。关于这段话,“By building a vibrant free-market democracy within larger European institutions secured by a U.S.-led NATO, West Germany created conditions in which the recovery of the country’s Soviet-occupied eastern
                      third was just a matter of time. ”, 我的解读和下面我发的一贴类似,用经济和制度(虽然战前俄、乌都已号称是民主制度)的优越性去争取最终的胜利(得回领土甚至吞并俄国),而不是一时的战争得失。言下之意,是现在停战求和,依托北约,发展经济,最后获取类似西德的成就。
      • A Report Card on the War in Ukraine +1
        本文发表在 rolia.net 枫下论坛
        If year two of the war were a carbon copy of the first, Russia would control almost one-third of Ukraine next February.

        Graham AllisonFebruary 23, 2023, 4:12 PM
        A person in military uniform is seen from the back, holding a door open in daylight.
        A person in military uniform is seen from the back, holding a door open in daylight.
        A member of Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service holds a door in Bakhmut, Ukraine, on Feb. 16. Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images
        By now, it is clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine has been a grave strategic error. As Napoleon Bonaparte’s former minister of police said of the French leader’s foolish execution of a rival duke, his actions could be described as “worse than a crime … a blunder.” Yet even as Putin’s war has undermined Russia on the geopolitical stage, we should not overlook the fact that Russia has succeeded in severely weakening Ukraine on the ground.

        This week, the Belfer Russia-Ukraine War Task Force, which I lead, is releasing a Report Card summarizing where things stand on the battlefield at the end of the first year of Russia’s war. As the Report Card documents, when we measure key indicators including territorial gains and losses, deaths of combatants and civilians, destruction of infrastructure, and economic impact, the brute facts are hard to ignore.

        At the battlefield level, if one can remember only three numbers, they are: one-fifth, one-third, and 40 percent.

        Since invading Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Russian troops have seized an additional 11 percent of Ukraine’s territory. When combined with land seized from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, that means Russia now controls almost one-fifth of the country. The Ukrainian economy has been crushed, its GDP declining by more than one-third. Ukraine is now dependent on the United States and Western Europe not only for weekly deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also for monthly subsidies to pay its soldiers, officials, and pensioners. Forty percent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been destroyed or occupied.

        The Report Card includes a dozen further indicators that shed light on the outcomes and cost of one year of war in Ukraine. These include one of Kyiv’s most closely held secrets: Ukrainian casualties. Western press coverage of the war has offered little reporting on this issue, but reliable U.S. government estimates count more than 130,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed or severely wounded—approximately the same number Russia has lost from a population more than three times larger than Ukraine’s. In addition, Russian forces have killed more than 7,000 Ukrainian civilians, committed an array of atrocities, and forced nearly 1 in 3 Ukrainian citizens to flee their homes. Today, 8 million Ukrainians are international refugees.

        Thus, as the Western press continues to highlight Ukraine’s successes, we should also recognize that if year two of the war were essentially a carbon copy of the first, in February 2024 Russia would control almost one-third of Ukraine.

        Read More

        Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony to mark the 75th anniversary of the Federal Medical-Biological Agency in Moscow.
        Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a ceremony to mark the 75th anniversary of the Federal Medical-Biological Agency in Moscow.
        ‘Putin Still Believes Russia Will Prevail’

        Angela Stent and Michael Kofman discuss one year of the war in Ukraine—and what to expect next on the battlefield.
        The war is, of course, imposing huge costs on Russia as well. But so far, Putin has shown no hesitation in paying whatever it takes. Moreover, the most severe of these costs, including the loss of European markets for Russia’s oil and gas, will be felt over the longer term. In the meantime, Moscow has demonstrated impressive resilience in adapting to unprecedented comprehensive sanctions. Despite Western governments advertising these sanctions as strangling, Russian revenues from exports of oil and gas actually went up last year, not down. Contrary to forecasts of most Western commentators, Russia’s economy has not imploded. As the Report Card notes, according to the most recent data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia’s economy fell last year much less than had been forecast—by just 2.3 percent—and the IMF expects it to return to positive growth in 2023. And since the invasion, while the value of Ukraine’s currency has declined by 18 percent, the Russian ruble has appreciated by 14 percent.

        This is not to say Russia has emerged as the clear victor on the ground. Since mid-November, fighting on the battlefield has been bogged down in what we call a “snailmate,” with the net change in territorial control favoring Russia by just 75 square miles. And as both Russia and Ukraine prepare new, major offensives for the near future, other developments seem to favor Ukraine, with one of the most important being the United States and European nations supplying Ukraine with increasingly lethal weapons—most recently, battle tanks.

        Of course, many factors that matter more than those in the Report Card are not easily measured. The Report Card identifies a number of these, such as morale, leadership, the will to fight, information warfare, and international support. We are hopeful that readers will suggest ways to assess these and other critical factors going forward. Since this is a work in progress, we intend to revise the Report Card as we receive feedback. Moreover, the Task Force will continue tracking these indicators in weekly updates on Harvard University’s Russia Matters website.

        Despite the Report Card’s findings, Putin’s successes on the battlefield cannot obscure the fact that his war has been a colossal strategic failure. Instead of erasing Ukraine from the map, Putin has enlivened Ukrainians’ sense of identity and confidence that they can build a viable modern nation. Rather than ensuring that Ukraine would never join the European Union or NATO, he has made its membership in these institutions likelier than ever before. By reviving a vivid sense of fear in Europeans, he has condemned his country to a new and likely lengthy chapter of cold war with a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic alliance whose GDP is 20 times that of Russia. One year on, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is deservedly the most admired leader on the international stage and Putin the most despised.

        Students of the U.S. War of Independence will remember the Battle of Bunker Hill. There, British soldiers occupying Boston succeeded in seizing the high ground. But their victory came at the cost of so many of their soldiers killed and severely wounded that they never undertook an initiative like that again. Let us hope that the West’s fortitude and Putin’s failure in this case reduces Russia’s appetite for subsequent attacks on its neighbors.更多精彩文章及讨论,请光临枫下论坛 rolia.net
    • 教授说的都是废话 +1
      • 也不完全废话,这位80多的老人认为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰完全是历史原因造成的,普京的鲁莽独裁自私和俄罗斯的腐败落后一点儿没提,这个很说明教授的立场。 +3
        • 看来美国也有代沟.
    • 教授们总要写点东西讨论,就和吃饭喝水一样,乌克兰立马投降肯定会少死很多人,这点连小孩子都知道吧, 那为什么不投降呢?因为和平是打出来的,俄罗斯当初反击德国侵略也没投降 +1
      • 还是有区别的。重要的区别在于,俄乌数十年前还是一家。某种意义上,可以类比为东西德战争、南北韩战争,大多数民众并不会太关心最终被谁统治,尤其是强势一方经济更好的情况下(即西德、南韩)。但是,“江东上下皆可降曹,独主公不能降曹”。
        • 台湾人民并不希望被大陆统治,乌克兰人也一样不希望被俄罗斯统治
          • 能不能说一下你如何得出这两个结论的? +1